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The aim of this article is to rethink a less theorized aspect of the British colonial model of 
“Indirect Rule” used to administer Nigeria. The commonplace understanding of this policy in 
Nigeria and elsewhere is that the British collaborated with, and used, “native aliens” (Ochonu, 
2014) or “Indigenous” regional chiefs as conduits for governing the colonies (Lange, 2009). In 
the Nigerian context, scholars suggest that the British adopted this policy because it was a 
convenient and inexpensive administrative model. The understanding is also that a coterie of 
British administrators, beginning with Lord Frederick Lugard, was to maximize the revenues 
from their colonies in order to cover the cost of governance (Berry, 1992). This view of the 
policy of indirect rule gives the impression that Nigeria, as a colonial creation, was essentially 
born out of the fusing together of previously sovereign peoples. That is, colonialism as the basis 
of Nigerian nationhood was only an indirect form of governance in which the colonizer governed 
Nigerian peoples through existing local authorities.  
The British Crown governed its conquered colonial territories through multiple systems 
of appointed authorities; some of these authorities came from existing political structures in the 
colonies. For example, largely due to the activities of the ruling Sokoto Islamic Caliphate in the 
region before the advent of the British (Richens, 2009), Northern Nigeria had centralized 
governing systems with a reputation for their bureaucratic, administrative, and judicial 
institutions. Indeed, the Fulani ruling class in the North, which established the Caliphate in the 
early nineteenth century under the leadership of the Islamic reformer Uthman dan Fodio, was 
successful in countering the Mahdist revolt of Satiru in 1906, a revolt that the British struggled to 
contain (Bayart, 2009; Falola, 2009). The British found, therefore, some pre-existing political 
structures useful for colonial control in the region. In other parts of Nigeria, such as some regions 
in the South—where the kinds of centralized political systems present in the North were 
lacking—the British instituted authorities, usually in the form of warrant chiefs (see Afigbo, 
1972, 1967). As in the North, these so-called local authorities became incorporated as colonial 
agents used to collect taxes and levies, to communicate with subjects, to give rewards and 
punishment, and to assemble labor for the colonist’s projects (Falola, 2009). This way of using 
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local Indigenous authorities allowed the British to avoid the financial, logistical, and 
administrative burden of ruling the colony directly. Thus, Richens (2009) described this system 
of indirect rule as “colonialism on the cheap” (p. 5).  
The foregoing perspective of British indirect rule policy in Nigeria through the agency of 
“native” rulers has been extensively covered in the literature (see, for example: Berry, 1992; 
Mamdani, 1997; Lange, 2009; Gerring, Ziblatt, DVan Gorp, & Arévalo, 2011; Falola, 2011; 
Ochonu, 2014; Yahaya, 2016). Our thesis departs from this body of literature that focuses on 
colonial intermediaries—sub-colonials—in the “(un)making” of Nigeria (Ochonu, 2014). Some 
of the literature on colonial indirect rule gives the impression that the British colonial project in 
Nigeria was one of nation-building, in which the quest to reduce governing costs led to the use of 
local rulers to govern. The assumption is that the major problem with the British colonial nation-
building project in Nigeria is the way in which the colonizer cobbled together different ethnic 
nationalities into a multiethnic state—a multiethnic condition believed to sponsor diverse 
structures of postcolonial violence. What we offer here, therefore, is a rethinking of the so-called 
British colonial indirect rule policy by tracing its origins in the Nigerian context to the Crown’s 
grant of charter rights to, and subsequent rule through, imperial companies around the Benue and 
Niger areas. We argue that consideration of colonial indirect rule in Nigeria must begin not with 
Governor Frederick Lugard’s pronouncement of such a policy in the early twentieth century, but 
with the prior imperial use of companies to secure and govern territories. This consideration 
reveals the corporate ideology underpinning the creation of Nigeria. The idea of the nation-state 
as a colonial corporation calls attention to some of the basic conditions of violence in the 
Nigerian postcolony. We use the postcolony, as Mbembe (2001) did, to suggest not just “a given 
historical trajectorythat of societies recently emerging from the experience of colonization and 
the violence which the colonial relationship involves,” but also “a series of corporate institutions 
and a political machinery that […] constitute a distinctive regime of violence” (p. 102). In this 
sense, the postcolony signifies both a historical process and a condition of violence.  
This article will focus on British indirect rule policy by overseas companies, such as the 
Royal Niger Company (RNC) and the United African Company (UAC). Other imperial British 
companies that operated in Nigeria include the United Trading Company (UTC), African Timber 
and Plywood Company (ATP), John Holt (JH), Paterson Zochonis (PZ), and Thomopoulus 
(Adeyeri & Adejuwon, 2012; Falola, 2009). Indeed, commerce constituted a central feature of 
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the British Empire (Johnson, 2007), “given the degree to which that empire relied upon non-state 
actors for both its economic and its infrastructural foundations” (Stern, 2013, p. 27). One of the 
general features of colonial governance, at least in the early period, was “the habit of delegating 
sovereignty to concessionary companies, sometimes over a period of decades” (Bayart, 2000, p. 
241). Nigeria’s trade in palm oil, palm kernels, and peanuts made the region a lucrative 
economic attraction site for the British (Falola, 2009). Johnson (2007) contends that the 
attraction of West Africa in terms of trade and produce, and its strategic location in the Atlantic 
seaboard, gave impetus to British interest in Nigeria. It is no surprise, therefore, that the British 
in colonial Nigeria tried to fend off interest in the region from France after the Berlin Conference 
of 1884-1885, in what Lugard perceived as the “French crisis.” This crisis informed his 
amalgamation of all British corporate interests in the region into one entity by January 1, 1900 
(Lugard, 1919). After this amalgamation, the British continued to rely on overseas companies to 
“govern” not just Nigeria, but also to integrate most of their colonies in Africa into capital 
markets (Bayart, 2009).  
 Contrary to the argument made in most of the literature: that the British created a nation 
(Nigeria) with the amalgamation policy of 1914, our argument is that there was never a nation in 
the first place. This is because British colonialism did not conceive nor organize as a nation, the 
place known today as Nigeria. Rather, the colonial project administered Nigeria as a corporatized 
entity. This colonial practice was not unique to Nigeria. India and many other British colonies 
were also governed as company-states (Stern, 2011). As a company-state, the colonial Crown’s 
aim was “to bind a multitude of people together into a legal singularity, an artificial person that 
could maintain common rights, police community standards and behaviour, and administer over 
and on behalf of the collectivity” (p. 7). Conceptualizing the colonial state in Nigeria as a 
company-state suggests that the colonizer imagined colonized peoples more as corporate 
“entities” than as national groups. The net effect of this colonial corporatization of political, 
economic, and social life was that Nigeria as a corporate colonial creation has remained 
imagined and governed not as a nation but as an industrial corporate entity.  
We are by no means suggesting here that there are set standards for administering a 
nation, as against managing business enterprises. We are rather calling attention to the 
ideological underpinnings of British colonial state creation and the continued impacts of this 
colonial ideology, especially regarding violence in the Nigerian postcolony. From this, we 
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suggest that the challenges of postcolonial nationhood in Nigeria derive impetus largely from 
this corporatized conception of colonial Nigeria.  
This paper does not merely make a case for thinking about British colonial indirect rule 
in Nigeria as a corporate rule. The originality of the paper lies in its illustration of how colonial 
corporate governance in Nigeria carried into the postcolony, constituting a basic engine of 
violence. Thus, we identify three violent phenomena in Nigeria in recent years resulting from 
this colonially-engendered corporate ideology—namely, militancy agitations, political 
corruption, and ethnoreligious crises. Therefore, considering these socio-political challenges 
emanating from a corporate ideology, we propose a re-imagination of the terms of statehood 
based on the notion of a nation as opposed to a notion of corporation.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the first section will debate rival 
explanatory frameworks such as the greed-grievance model, state failure thesis, human needs 
theory, primordialism, and the instrumentalist thesis. The next section examines the conception 
of British colonial indirect rule by companies. This is followed by an exploration of the impacts 
of this colonial corporate governance on the Nigerian postcolony. The concluding section offers 
our vision for moving forward, away from the challenges of corporatized nationhood in 
postcolonial Nigeria. 
Rival Explanatory Frameworks 
While we fault the corporatization of Nigeria as part of the problem that birthed violent 
conflicts and corruption in Nigeria’s postcolony, some conflict and corruption scholars would 
argue that factors other than colonialism could even more convincingly explain these vices in 
Nigeria. Thus, we will begin by debating the extent of applicability of other competing theories 
that have been used to account for the vices of corruption and violent conflicts in postcolonial 
Africa.  
One of these theories is “primordialism” or the “ancient hatred” theory. Primordialists 
would argue that ethnic identity is a fixed characteristic of individuals and groups because ethnic 
group identities flow from an extended kinship bond, sharing common behaviors, and 
transmitting basic norms and customs across generations (Porto, 2008, p. 58). The main 
assumption of the primordial explanation of ethnic or communal conflicts is that such kinds of 
conflicts are unique and are unconnected to the socio-political or economic realities of people. 
An example of this primordialist thinking regarding violence in Africa may be found in Africa 
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Works: Disorder as Political Instrument by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Chabal and 
Daloz (1999) argued that ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone illustrate 
the barbarity and savagery of the partisans of such conflicts (p. 82). The authors also claimed that 
African conflicts are partly inspired by the superstitious beliefs of the inhabitants of that 
continent who tend to prioritize the irrational level in their everyday life (p. 63). In a rebuttal of 
Chabal and Daloz’s explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, Mkandawire (2008) argued that 
such kinds of reductionist and exclusionary thinking “takes historical continuity and cultural 
relativism to absurd extremes” (p. 108). Apart from the fact that the nature of African violence is 
not unique but rather normative of violence in other parts of the world, reducing African violence 
to primordial irrationalism fails to take seriously consideration of organized violence as rational 
act.  
Another theory is the econometric “greed” explanation advanced by Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argued that conflict, particularly civil wars in Africa, 
are caused by the prevalence of primary resources such as oil or diamonds, which provide the 
context for corruption, bad governance, greed, and precipitate popular grievance and frustration. 
They maintained that the availability of finance through the export of primary commodities 
makes rebellion tenable and attractive to warlords and their supporters (p. 588). The econometric 
model provided rationale for international assistance and intervention by international 
institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations 
(Hutchful & Aning, 2004, p. 201). Such a possibility of international intervention further 
counters the primordialist claims of African violence as resulting from irrational devotion to 
ancient tribal hatred, since African violence may be understood as products of economic 
competition.  
Yet, to a significant extent, as Keen (2012) noted, the economic greed explanation of 
anti-state rebellion is “politically convenient” (p. 758) for existing politico-economic institutions. 
This economic greed model unduly privatizes collective rebellion instead of correctly 
politicizing it. The model delegitimizes rebellion and absolves state structures and global 
institutions from conditions leading to rebellion, as if the state and similar global political 
structures have no role to play in the existence of subaltern resistance. 
Furthermore, there is the “instrumentalist” or the “elite mobilization” theory. The 
mobilization theory explains how political processes are “crucial to shaping how and when 
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cultural differences are emphasized” (Ross, 2001, p. 236). The mobilization theory attributes the 
sources of intercommunal conflicts to the manipulation or essentialization of cultural identities, 
symbols, memories, and rituals by elite entrepreneurs (Bräuchler, 2015, p. 13). The 
instrumentalization or mobilization of identity by politicians or local elites “presupposes that 
more than an immutable factor, identity is amenable to social construction and manipulation and 
is therefore influenced by the same patterns that characterize group mobilization at other levels 
and for different purposes” (Porto, 2008, p. 58).  
There is also the state-failure theory, which views communal conflicts as an outcome of 
the state’s inability or incapacity to provide basic goods and services and security for its citizens. 
Rotberg (2002) argued that states fail when they are unable to provide basic security and political 
goods to their citizens, including education, healthcare, infrastructure, employment opportunities, 
and a legal framework for law and order (p. 87). The state failure theory is closely related to 
Burton’s (1990) Human Needs explanation of conflicts, which holds that the lack of fulfilment of 
certain needs of safety, identity, culture, freedom, self-esteem, and justice may result in conflict.  
However, the problem with the state failure and human needs theses is that they do not 
explain why in a context where many groups lack requisite political goods and services and 
human needs, only few groups of people use violence to seek redress and fulfil their needs.  
Moreover, the human needs and state failure explanations of violent conflicts also beg the 
question, especially in the African context: if rebel groups or certain members of a disadvantaged 
community used violent means to demand social justice, good governance, and basic goods and 
services that they deserve, why do they not provide these goods and services to their population 
after they attained political power (Maiangwa, 2017).  
In a way then, the foregoing theoretical approaches, which also flirt with a dangerous and 
incorrect stereotype of Africa’s socio-political space and life as inherently ridden with social 
vices and violence, only offer incomplete analyses of the nature of violence in Nigeria’s 
postcolony. What we intend to conceptualize in this paper is the authenticity of the historical 
trajectory of the logic of violence in Nigeria’s postcolony. Ultimately, our claim is that the order 
of violence in Nigeria’s postcolony derives from a long history of corporate governmentality in 




The “Nation” as Corporation 
How did imperial corporate bodies become the conduit of a variant of colonial rule? That 
is, what was the reality of corporatizing and privatizing colonial governance through colonial 
companies like the Royal African Company (RAC) and later the RNC, and by 1929 the UAC? In 
Stern’s (2008) conceptualization of the colonial company-state with regards to the East India 
Company, there were three processes in which colonial company sovereignty—that is, company 
rule or rule through companies—became cemented in the colonies. It started with the granting of 
English Crown charters, and was followed by treaties, contracts and (oftentimes) violent 
encounters between companies and natives. Finally, it led to the actual commercial monopoly 
and political behavior of imperial companies. As Stern notes, this conception of imperial 
companies acting like states, with states, or for states, takes cognizance of the nature of national 
territorial states at the time “in which national territorial states did not have a monopoly on 
political power and in which sovereignty was composite, incomplete, hybrid, layered, and 
overlapping” (p. 273). In that context, the three outlined processes simultaneously opened the 
trade to companies, allowed them to cultivate diplomatic relationships with indigenes, and the 
protection of passage and settlement, and eventually allowed colonial companies to “claim a sort 
of just proprietorship”  in the colonies.  
We take each of these processes in turn. On the first process of granting charter rights to 
companies, it is important to refer to a distinction between informal and formal colonial rule. 
Gallagher and Robinson (1953) argued that British statesmen favored informal rule in which 
expansion took place “without the exercise of direct political control over the area concerned” 
(see Gallagher & Robinson, 1953; cited in Hopkins, 1968, p. 581). Additionally, we note that 
corporate merchants, as was the case for the East India Company, consistently stated their 
intention not to govern colonies (The Economist, 2011). However, “as rival state companies tried 
to muscle in on their business,” these merchants decided to take huge colonial territories under 
their direct political control in order to protect their commercial interests.  
To understand the corporatized governance model of the Nigerian colonial state, following 
in Stern’s (2008) conceptualization, one must consider the granting of charter rights to 
companies such as the RNC by the English Crown. This granting of charter rights to companies 
served dual purposes. First, it served the purpose of political expediency of, in this case, imperial 
Britain’s intention to avoid direct/formal control. Second, it served the purpose of commercial 
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expediency of imperial companies, which feared that a separation between commerce and 
politics would harm business interests. In the context of this imperial political-commercial grand 
stratagem, it makes sense to postulate that it was only when “free-trading imperialism met 
obstacles…towards the end of the [nineteenth] century” that formal British rule was established 
only as a last resort (Hopkins, 1968, p. 581). In Nigeria, we can accept or at least theorize that 
the concept of indirect rule through companies came about at the intersection of mutual 
commercial and political interests. Prior to formal colonization in the place known today as 
Nigeria, British companies with different profit interests laid claims to trade territories around 
the Niger and Benue rivers. The most characteristic is the RAC led by George Taubman Goldie. 
The RAC grew its influence through an expansionist vision that saw it claim trade territories and 
corporate monopoly over the Niger area. In 1886, the British granted Goldie’s RAC charter 
rights to Nigeria under the name of the RNC, following the 1885 Berlin Conference where 
European nations shared out African territories amongst themselves in the “scramble for Africa” 
(Baker, 1996).  
As a chartered company, the RNC had both commercial and governing rights over the 
territories of Nigeria. The exercise of these charter rights meant that the RNC had to establish 
trading posts across areas of its interest and build a military force to aid its governing mandate, 
taking absolute control of the area. As company and government all at once, the RNC combined 
trading and governing functions, as did the East India Company, to “erect and administer law; 
collect taxes; provide protection; inflict punishment; perform stateliness; regulate economic, 
religious, and civic life; conduct diplomacy and wage wars; make claims to jurisdiction over land 
and sea; cultivate authority and obedience from those people subject to its command” (Stern, 
2011, p. 3-6). The granting of royal charter in 1886 could be interpreted as the first step in the 
RNC becoming a form or a conduit of government in Nigeria. Put differently, the British Crown 
contracted a company to govern a territory on its behalf.  
Although charter rights meant that imperial corporations benefited from Crown-backed 
monopoly, security and military might, total control in the colonies needed, more or less, local 
“native” support. This is where the second process of Stern’s (2011) conceptualization becomes 
relevant. The RNC, like the East India Company, as explained by Stern, was more or less like 
two organizations, having a hierarchy with its nucleus in London and other franchises spread 
across colonial Nigeria. Once the London-based Crown had given the RNC charter rights, 
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agreements and contracts with locals further “legitimised” company activities across the colony, 
reinforced by exclusive contracts, grants, and treaties, which sometimes involved violence and 
scandal. Thus, Dirks (2006) noted, colonial scandals became the “crucible in which both imperial 
and capitalist expansion was forged” (p. 8).  
The political behavior of the RNC in Nigeria and other such companies was the most state-
like, manifested in the power to exact agreements and contracts, raise and maintain armies, and 
monopolize the colonial economy. Between 1882 and 1884, Goldie’s company “expanded at the 
expense of smaller traders in the area and obtained new concessions of trading and political 
rights from tribal chiefs” (Pearson, 1971, p. 71). The RNC also specifically attempted to subvert 
pre-existing arrangements by sidestepping local middlemen (Coleman, 1958, p. 438). 
Consequently, this imperial mercantile tradition “restricted the growth of African industries so as 
to prevent them from competing with these enterprises” (Kilson Jr, 1958, p. 385-386). The 
Company thereby “crushed the very profitable trade of this small group of Africans who 
operated in its trading concession” (Pearson, 1971, p. 81). 
Rather than any interest in the proper administration of colonial nationhood, the primary 
mercantilist focus in this Crown-RNC partnership is illustrated by Baker (1960, p. 151) who 
noted that even imperial trading agents were not under any obligation to send regular reports to 
the Crown in London, or even to their Head Offices. The primary concern of the British 
Government and the Head Offices was the profit made and reported by the trading agents who 
had the total political and commercial discretion to use any method and overcome any difficulty 
to bring about the desired economic returns (p. 151). Thus, the colonial Governor was required to 
protect the contribution of legitimate commerce by imperial corporations because it was their 
contribution to colonial revenue that enabled the Governor to carry out his colonial duties 
(Hopkins, 1968). In Nigeria, this primary profit-making motive of colonial rule through 
companies may explain the fact that when relations between Goldie and British administrators in 
the Crown Colony of Lagos and in the Niger Coast Protectorate became strained, Goldie’s 
“efforts to move into the interior along the Niger and Benue Rivers aroused constant concern on 
the parts of the British administrators… who feared that their access to hinterland trade might be 
impaired” (Pearson, 1971, p. 81). 
Moreover, the legitimation of company rule in Nigeria involved both hard (military) and 
soft (treaty/agreements) approaches. It also involved the appropriation of indigenes into the 
10 
 
corporatized colonial governance both as administrators and military personnel. Through them, 
the Company as a governing body perpetrated many atrocities (Falola, 2009). In 1886, the same 
year it received its charter from the British Crown, the RNC established what it called the Royal 
Niger Constabulary, comprising an army and naval forces. The atrocities the Company 
perpetrated with these forces are widely documented (Falola, 2009). In a bid to monopolize trade 
in the area, the RNC’s army forcefully brought most kingdoms in the region under its 
management. The order of violence put in place by such colonial companies as the RNC is most 
aptly captured in what Mbembe (2001) has described as colonial rationality in the context of 
French colonial rule in Africa. Colonial rationality suggests a kind of rule by total subjection, 
derived from the notion of sovereign rights. The company was a limited liability, which also 
meant that its agents bore no responsibilities for any action in pursuance of the company’s 
charter rights. Treaties and laws issued by the limited liability company were meant to govern 
and exploit, at will, those under absolute subjection. The colonial company was above the law; it 
was the “Leviathan state.”  
The insistence on corporate profits and imperial savings by the colonial machinery meant 
that even indirect rule by natives, a system purported to have been a blueprint of effective 
colonial administration, may have been an outcome of an imperial fiscal austerity policy, which 
made it easy for colonial corporate governors to govern with little funds and with few people, 
and hence minimize cost (Nwabughuogu, 1981, p. 67-68). Even this decision to have a formal 
colony of indirect rule through natives was a last resort to rescue imperial trading from a new set 
of political obstacles. For example, the French and the Germans “were changing the rules of 
colonial administration in Africa, and the signing of treaties and bribing of chiefs backed by 
some vague international stamp of approval were no longer sufficient to provide legal claim to 
an area” (Pearson, 1971, p. 75).  
The operationalization of this corporatized inevitable logic of empire in Nigeria as 
explained above means that the RNC, its predecessor: the RAC, and its 1929 successor: the UAC 
all aspired to be not just “a state within a state,” or “semi-sovereign status,” or a “delegated 
sovereignty”; that is, a sort of “department of state” with “quasi-governmental powers.” But also, 
they aspired to be and sometimes were the state, at least in Stern’s (2008) conceptualization of 
what constitutes a “company state.”  
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From the foregoing—and in our attempt to situate present socio-political challenges in 
postcolonial Nigeria in the context of the colonial corporatization of governance—it is crucial to 
ask: how did this corporatization of colonial governance impact the social and political life of 
“Nigerians” in the postcolonial era? Here, we might remember Chatterjee’s (1986) contention 
that nationalism is not just a “derivative discourse” in postcolonial setting such as Nigeria. The 
challenge of contemporary nationhood in ex-colonies is that its salience came from the colonial 
encounter, in the case of this article, the corporatized colonial enterprise. It is safe, therefore, to 
assert that the eventual amalgamation or the creation of Nigeria was also first an economic 
venture before it was political. The Lord Selborne Report of 1898, in offering recommendations 
on the making of Nigeria noted, “we are of opinion that the Niger cannot form the dividing line; 
both banks of the Niger must be under one jurisdiction on account of the international questions 
which will probably arise in connection with the use of the river” (Uzoigwe, 1968, p. 468). The 
“international questions” in the report very likely referred to trade and the associated profits that 
came with it. Economic interests and the resulting corporate profits were thus at the very heart of 
the creation of Nigeria.   
The impact of the corporatized governance of the Niger area was felt not only on local 
economics, it also unsettled or at best defined the political and cultural dynamics of colonial 
“Nigerians” as well as the future Nigerian polity. Hermann (2011) illustrated how the need for 
monetization as a way of improving trade and making profits was imperial and supported by elite 
Nigerians (p. 396). These elites were to become the leaders of postcolonial Nigeria. Under the 
indirect rule of companies in Nigeria, corporatized imperial alliances with local peoples were so 
malleable, in pursuit of native legitimacy, that these collaborationist locals saw a need to look 
after their own economic interests in that corporatized process. In northern Nigeria, for example, 
political agents became primarily interested in searching for personal gain from the colonial 
administration (Afeadie, 1996). While they assisted communication and diplomacy with native 
authorities and gathered information for the colonial government, they also oversaw their own 
economic interests (Afeadie, 1996). In the southern protectorates, the economic interest of 
Britain and Lagosian merchants converged due to their mutual profit-making ventures (Hermann, 
2011). They later agreed that the use of barter as a medium of exchange had dire economic 
consequences, and this led to the creation of a colonial government that legalized the pound as 
medium of exchange (Hermann, 2011). 
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In 1937, “the British colonial government awarded Shell and British Petroleum (BP) the 
total land area of Nigeria as an oil concession” with oil exportation starting in 1958 (Onimode, 
1978, p. 210). The UAC, which in 1929 became a conglomerate of other colonial companies 
including the RNC, controlled commerce in West Africa and elsewhere until 1987 (Fieldhouse, 
1994). Consequently, while Shell and BP eventually gave up the abovementioned oil 
concessions, some of these concessions went on to be owned by the American multinationals 
Gulf and Mobil (Onimode, 1978, p. 210). The economic motive behind the implementation of 
the above recommendation of the Selborne Report, and various profit-making arrangements and 
decisions which followed, may have “given rise to great difficulties for the future stability of 
Nigeria” (Uzoigwe, 1968, p. 468). Moreover, with Christian missionaries, “tribal” chiefs and 
educated Africans partaking in the imperial running of the Benue and Niger areas before 1914—
and in the administration of colonial Nigeria after 1914 until 1960 as an industrial complex 
whose primary motive was profit—we have a basis to argue that first, colonial Nigeria was 
effectively run as a corporation, and second, that this primary economic foundation of 
contemporary Nigeria has led to corporate cultural, social, and political communities that find 
meaning in the creation of Nigeria not as a nation but as an imperial industrial machine.  
Nigeria as Company-State: The Order of Postcolonial Violence 
Most often, the argument has been that colonialism—or in the context of this article, 
British colonialism—produced a disjointed nationhood due to autocratic “colonial policies” of an 
imperially orchestrated politico-historical blacksmithing: “simultaneous acts of ethnocultural 
splitting and joining” (Suleiman & Maiangwa, 2017). What we are sketching out in this article, 
however, is a rethink of the ideas of the (postcolonial) state that originated from corporatized 
colonial ideology. It is important, even if only conceptually, to ask what kinds of political, social 
and economic communities emerged through a colonial process that conceived the nation-state as 
a corporate, trading organization. By 1899 when the British Crown revoked the RNC’s charter 
and took on a more active role in the administration of its Nigerian territories, formerly 
independent kingdoms, nations, and peoples became effectively transformed into sub-units of a 
mega corporation. This takeover from the RNC by no means altered the already instituted 
corporate governmentality in colonial Nigeria. The organization of social, political and economic 
life along corporate or commercial lines continued. As discussed in the introduction, the well-
known British colonial policy of indirect rule that assumedly used local authorities to govern was 
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only a pretext for what was rather a commercialist ideology that set up so-called local authorities 
as business managers. The use of these local rulers to collect taxes and levies, to manage labor, 
and implement the colonist’s corporate laws and policies supports the claim that the colonized 
nation-state was at best “a company-state.”   
The violence that produced the company-state is the violence to corporatize politics, 
territory, human body, and resources. Corporatization also signalled the reorganization of the 
political order of pre-existing corporate royal powers. Importantly, we are not suggesting here 
that corporatization of the political originated solely from the RNC’s activities in the late 
nineteenth century. Centuries of trade in human beings (through the slave trades) saw the 
transformation of sovereignties in what became Nigeria into corporate entities founded 
essentially on the exercise of violence as the order of trade. Empires and kingdoms (for example, 
the Benin, Oyo, Opobo, and Arochukwu kingdoms in Southern Nigeria, as well as the emirates 
of Kontagora, Kano, Sokoto, and Zaria in Northern Nigeria) had long transformed into trading 
states in which the political was coterminous with the commercial, and in which trading was the 
objective of governmentality. These sovereignties had their territories of influence and 
surrounding areas where they resourced trading items. Of course, the geographies of such 
corporatized polities changed regularly as wars and migrations altered their systems and 
conditions of subjections.  
What colonial companies such as the RNC did was essentially to incorporate these 
various corporations into a capitalist monopoly. The company-state was thus a product of a 
chaotic jumble of corporate sovereignties. Both during and after the official life of European 
colonization, this incorporated polity serves one key interest, notwithstanding the micro interests 
of its various units: the monopolization of material, political, and social economy. This 
monopolizing element of the company-state is what we sketch in this article as a hallmark 
sponsoring simultaneously the advance and dissolution of the Nigerian company-state in the 
postcolony.  
What is at stake here is not simply how colonial companies played a vital role in the 
organization of what became Nigeria. It is also not only how economic motives drove colonial 
companies in their quest for absolute profit to use violence on colonized populations. Rather, it is 
the conditions of organized social and political life emerging from this colonial indirect rule by 
companies. The first proposition to note is that the colonial rationality that produced the 
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“Nigerian state” conceived it as an industrial complex not as a nation, as a company-state not as 
a civil entity. Conceived thus as a business, social and political life became organized around the 
exploitation and production of labor community for the colonist. Local structures of relationship 
and governance were either undermined or appropriated for commercial gains. Civil life became 
transformed into a salaried condition in which “‘salary-earner,’ ‘citizen,’ and ‘client’ reciprocally 
reproduced one another or, at any event, participated in a single structure of conscious 
representations well described by what has been called politique du ventre, ‘the politics of the 
belly’” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 75; Bayart, 2009).  
The second proposition is that the nation as a corporate entity suggests that what 
constitutes a nation becomes less the structures of social life that are organized around the 
wellbeing of members. It is rather the organization of society as business, institutionalized 
around, and designed toward, one aim: commerce. It is the corporatization of living. This 
corporatization of living is not only suggestive of the commodificatory practices of capitalism on 
life. In addition, the corporatization of a polity sets up a system of competitiveness that works 
towards the dissolution of the nation. And nothing expresses the conditions of this 
corporatization of nationhood more than the unresolved question of the subject of/with rights 
deriving from colonialism: what/who constitutes the subject of rights in the postcolony. The 
subject has prerogatives to rule over others, to define others, to enact laws, to represent others, to 
make meaning, and to control others.  
The continued order of large-scale violence witnessed since so-called postcolonial times 
and particularly in twenty-first-century Nigeria bears all the trappings of the corporatized reality 
highlighted above. The first decade of the twenty-first century, for example, witnessed three 
major kinds of large-scale violence in the country. The first is the rise of radical militancy in the 
Niger-Delta region, the second is structural or indirect violence manifested through high-level 
political corruption, and the third disguises as ethnoreligious agitations.  
At the centre of militancy in the Niger-Delta region is control over proceeds accruing 
from crude oil exploitation. El-Khawas (2012) explained that the root of the Niger Delta crisis, 
“lie in the long-term exploitation of the region’s human and natural resources. It was slavery in 
the pre-colonial period, palm oil during the British rule, and now [crude] oil” (p. 112). The 
Niger-Delta region has been a hub of mass violence based on the changing demands for 
resources that nature and history somehow conspire to place in the region. As a coastal region, 
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the slave trade thrived in this region, reshaping its political and social organizations. From the 
mid-nineteenth century, the demand for palm oil and kernel (resources also found in enormous 
quantities in the region) and control over some of these trade commodities led to intense crises 
between different competing interests. Particularly between the RNC and the corporatized 
political sovereignties in the region, a popular instance was the 1895 attack on the RNC’s port 
facilities at Akassa along the Oil Rivers by the Nembe people of Brass, and the brutal response 
by the RNC (Pearson, 1971, p. 75).   
The rise of Niger-Delta militancy in the twenty-first century brings closer the continued 
influence of colonial companies in Nigeria—companies such as Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria. These militant agitations highlight “the multiple forms of private indirect 
government” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 67, emphasis in the original) described by Mbembe as 
constitutive of the violence of economics and the violence against the monopolistic order of the 
postcolonial state. At once, these militant groups are far from uniform. Their agitation is not 
essentially nationalistic. Rather, it is premised on resource control, shown in how militant groups 
attempt to use force to lay claims to economic resources and spaces of influence. While it may 
seem that these militant groups are violent in nature or are anti-government, it is likely that most 
of them were initially opposed to violence. However, as their grievances were not being 
addressed, they resorted to violence and turned it into an instrument of economic appropriation, 
challenging the state’s monopoly on economic resources. For example, prior to his execution in 
the hands of the junta in Nigeria in 1995, the late environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa, led a non-
violent movement known as the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). 
However, his execution and the continued repression of the rights of the Niger Delta people, saw 
the emergence of violent forms of activism including the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).  In this exercise 
of confiscating resources, the groups become private sovereignties, able to participate in 
international market economies that provide them with the means to legitimize their agitation. 
Moreover, they provide or dramatize a sense of providing those under the sphere of their control 
with public administrative obligations and welfare that the state is supposed to provide. They are 
militant agitators, governments, and sovereign all at once. Thus, there is a sense to which we can 
argue that the continued militancy in the Niger Delta speaks more to outcomes of exploitative 
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corporatization of peoples and their environments than about people’s innate propensity to 
violence.  
Structural violence in Nigeria also emanated from this reality of corporate nationhood, 
manifested by a high level of political corruption, and Nigeria’s dependence on and connivance 
with colonial companies. A prime example of such connivance was demonstrated in the 
Halliburton scandal. Haliburton, an American oil multinational corporation, was involved in an 
alleged scandal of paying over $182 million to Nigerian high-profile politicians to secure a 
contract to build a $4 billion Nigerian liquefied Natural Gas Plant in the Niger Delta region 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006). The Haliburton scandal in Nigeria brings closer not just the 
continued influence of colonial companies in Nigeria; it also “exacerbates the unrest associated 
with many parts of the postcolonial world and renders murky the geographies of crime and 
violence that configure popular perceptions of that world” (p. 8). The scandal also reveals a 
“complex north-south collaboration” (p. 8) and coloniality that verges on exploitation and 
corruption in the postcolony. This relationship is manifested in the continued alliance for state 
robbery forged by African postcolonial leaders, multinationals, and superpowers (Lumumba-
Kasango, 2013). Moreover, the clamour for state power with the attendant violence, particularly 
during elections and in the post-election periods, clearly illustrates the absence of “nationhood” 
and speaks more about Nigeria’s skewed leadership orientation and propensity towards state 
robbery than about an honest or selfless desire to govern.  
The seemingly ethnoreligious violence identified with such groups as Boko Haram in 
northeast Nigeria operates from a similar order of corporatized political and social practice. It is 
not a mere coincidence that the rise of such private sovereignties disguised as ethnoreligious 
nationalisms overlaps with the deregulation of the market and the increasing privatization of the 
means of survival and coercion in twenty-first-century Nigeria. These violent tensions are not 
simply a response to the failures of the state. They are also suggestive of the increasingly 
deregulatory process of the incorporation cobbled together under British colonialism.  
Thus, the contribution of this paper lies in its conceptualization and unraveling of the 
historicity of Nigeria’s social vices, which, to our reckoning, subsist in the ongoing 
corporatization of the country. The commercialist foundation of Nigeria makes thinking about 
nationhood and social relations beyond economics and commerce difficult. Consequently, social 
and political structures of governance and civic life are organized around corporate governance. 
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And this corporate governance thrives essentially on violent forms, be they in the exploitation 
and expropriation of resources, the pollution of environment, unbridled greed, the contests over 
rights to territories of influence, and the institutionalization of corruption as a cultural norm. This 
conceptualization of violence in Nigeria’s postcolony fits nicely into the structural mode of 
violence described by Johan Galtung (2007). The idea of structural violence explains how the 
forces of conflict—in this instance, commercial exploitation—are built into the social structure 
of a society, where a steeped and curious division exists between those of higher and lower strata 
of society. The latter are described as the dangerous classes due to the possibility that they may 
one day call into question the injustices of their society in rebellious ways (p. 18).  
Conclusion: Rethinking Corporate Nationhood and the Order of Peace 
We have argued that Nigeria was never envisioned to become a nation. Rather, the 
British acquired the colony by force through charter companies, and since then, it has existed as 
an acquired industrial complex (Falola, 2009). The corporatized “state” birthed unprecedented 
levels of violence and social disintegration in the postcolony. The challenge then is to figure out 
how populations, imagined as elements of a corporation, can disentangle themselves from this 
exploitative trap and re-envision a more meaningfully reality. To usefully engage this process, 
there is a need to understand the root of the “Nigeria problem.” One of the proponents of the 
field of Peace and Conflict Studies, John Burton (1997), has argued that the constructive 
resolution of conflict will make no sense if insights gained as to the roots of such conflicts are 
not deciphered and used to anticipate and prevent the onset of future conflicts. 
What lies at the roots of most conflicts in Nigeria is not primordialism, state-failure, 
greed-grievance, direct invasion of colonialists, or even Lord Lugard’s pronouncement of the 
creation of Nigeria in 1914. Rather, it is the prior imperial use of companies to secure and govern 
territories. We argue that redressing the wrongs of the past hinges on understanding present-day 
Nigeria, not as a nation but as a corporate entity. Arguably, this knowledge can be useful in the 
creation of new workable reality in Nigeria based either on the idea of nationhood or at least on 
some form of inclusive governance or citizenship, which must be tempered with the lived socio-
cultural experiences of the governed.  
We propose, therefore, a system of peacebuilding and societal restructuring based on the 
legitimate goals and agency of all parties involved. Galtung (2007) described this kind of 
peacebuilding as one that legitimizes the affected parties as agents in their own right who can 
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identify their needs and goals and work through the contradictions and differences between such 
goals without calling in experts from outside. This mode of peacebuilding or conflict 
transformation places enormous power and responsibility on the people affected by social 
injustices and violence. Ultimately, the issue of whether conflict-affected communities have 
“agency” in their own rights constitutes an interesting vista of research in the field of peace and 
conflict studies.  
The field of peace and conflict studies can be a frontier in exploring forces of colonial 
oppression and injustices in which many societies remain entrapped. Critical and emancipatory 
peacebuilding holds enormous potential for rethinking the terms of violent relations in Nigeria. 
In the Nigerian case, this rethinking would entail a serious mental effort of self-criticism and 
appraisal. Galtung (2007) explained that “mental task would be cognitive/emotional 
disobedience, refusing to structure the inner world in that polarized way, also identifying the 
negative in Self and the positive in Other. Avoiding the trap of Self-hatred combined with Other-
love; that is only polarization in reverse, not reversed” (p. 29). He stated that a primary condition 
for this emancipatory peacebuilding to happen is by maintaining an open mind and developing 
the courage to believe, and take the risk to think, speak, and to act upon it (Galtung, 2007, p. 29). 
In the context of Nigeria, such actions might entail dialoguing with formerly condemned enemies 
including so-called terrorists and militants, creating peace education forums rooted in the socio-
political history of the land, acknowledging and seeking apology for past wrongdoings, 
commemorating victims of violence, holding interfaith encounters, and pursuing justice for 
aggrieved communities in whatever form.  Thinking through these practical steps can help 
formerly colonized societies to identify both historical and contemporary conditions of their 
oppression (internally or externally-inflicted). Through these steps, Nigerians can recreate 
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